Abstract-Integrity assurance of configuration data has a significant impact on microcontroller-based systems reliability. This is especially true when running applications driven by events which behavior is tightly coupled to this kind of data. This work proposes a new hybrid technique that combines hardware and software resources for detecting and recovering soft-errors in system configuration data. Our approach is based on the utilization of a common built-in microcontroller resource (timer) that works jointly with a software-based technique, which is responsible to periodically refresh the configuration data. The experiments demonstrate that non-destructive single event effects can be effectively mitigated with reduced overheads. Results show an important increase in fault coverage for SEUs and SETs, about one order of magnitude.
INTRODUCTION
MICROCONTROLLERS are key components in safety-critical and high availability missions, because their programmability, performance and cost-effectiveness. In addition, Commercial Off-The-Shelf electronic components (COTS) offer important capabilities and benefits in the implementation of low-cost systems, and are opening new opportunities in space and avionic industry, such as small satellites [1] or safety systems [2] . However, COTS microcontrollers' main drawback remains the low tolerance to radiation-induced effects. This fact can limit their applicability in the near future [3] , [4] and consequently there is an increasing effort focused on developing new hardening techniques for COTS-based systems.
Different approaches have been proposed to tackle this problem. Among them, hardware redundancy is the most usual and effective solution when is applied in qualified RadHard microprocessors. However, this fine-grain redundancy does not fit in COTS components because the impossibility to modify their internal hardware. Coarse-grain alternatives, as duplication or triplication of components [5] , have also been explored and even used in real systems, obtaining very good results. These approaches increase the complexity, cost and power consumption; hiding the benefits of COTS components and limiting their use in low-cost and small systems.
Software-based techniques also known as Software Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance (SIHFT) do not require any modifications in the hardware of the microprocessor and they provide higher flexibility as well as lower development time and cost [6] . These techniques can detect and recover faults that are latent in the data inside the microprocessor (mainly in register file and micro-architecture registers) [14] , as well as faults in the control flow [7] . Their main drawbacks are usually related to the overheads in code size and execution time.
In this context, configuration data are one of the most fault-sensitive bits of microcontrollers, especially in mission-critical reactive systems which are usually driven by events. The control flow of these programs is determined by diverse event sources synchronized with interrupts. The main algorithm is modeled by means of diverse interrupt service routines (ISR) which react to the different external events. The use of interrupts avoids the need of a constantly polling loop and reduces the computational effort of the microprocessor. The configuration involves two main sets of data. First, data devoted to define the operation of peripherals which generate or acquire the external events, such as timers, I/O ports, A/D converters, UARTs, etc. . . Second, data to define the behavior of interrupts (interrupt vectors, interrupt mask, etc. . .). It is worth noting the criticality of this configuration data set. For example, the corruption of the interrupt mask registers can have catastrophic consequences because some critical interrupt sources may be blocked or, alternatively, unwanted interrupts may be randomly generated.
Nevertheless, as far as we know, very little attention has been paid to the protection of configuration data of microcontroller peripherals and interrupts related registers. The fact that in most of the cases the configuration data are stored in some kind of protected memory may be the reason of this lack of attention. Designers have usually addressed this issue adopting as guidelines a set of good practices jointly with ad-hoc solutions [15] .
Among them, one of the most usual techniques is blind scrubbing of the whole memory contents [27] , which is too time consuming and also stops the operation of the system. This strategy is not sufficient for dependable designs where a short recovery time is required, because during the normal system operation those critical configuration data leave the secure storage of memory and pass to reside in vulnerable dedicated registers. On the other hand, protection by means of traditional software-only techniques may reduce the recovery time, but also may produce a high waste of resources due to the long (or unlimited) lifetime of configuration data.
In this work, we propose a hybrid technique that leverages the advantages of SIHFT and self-scrubbing techniques. It is aimed to the soft error mitigation in the system configuration data, and especially focused on interrupt-driven applications. The proposal is based on the utilization of a common built-in COTS microcontroller resource (timer) that works jointly with a software-based technique, which is responsible to periodically refresh the configuration data. Unlike usual scrubbing approaches, our on-line technique works on the fly without stopping the system. Preliminary results were presented in [24] .
To assess the reliability provided by the studied approach, a fault injection campaign was carried out on a microcontroller using a non-intrusive tool [8] . The microcontroller was built around the PicoBlaze soft-core [9] . per second). Let P(F(x), T) be the fault probability of a set of configuration registers x having a lifetime of T seconds. It is supposed that n bits of the configuration registers are critical such that SEUs always become a failure. The same might not apply to the rest of bits within a real system. As reported by [22] , the probability of not upsetting during a time t can be modeled by the 0th order Poisson distribution. Thus, it can be expressed as P ðcorrect; tÞ ¼ e
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Therefore MTTF (mean time to failure) can be calculated as
Real 16-bit MCU COTS-based systems running applications of some complexity usually need more than 300 configuration bits. To highlight the importance of hardening the configuration bits in an actual system, let us suppose a Texas Instrument MSP430-based system (used in [1] , [23] Assuming an actual on-orbit probability density of p ¼ 1:20e À 4 SEU/bit-day [26] , and n ¼ 382 bits, we obtain a MTTF of 0.0597 years (% 22 days), which is an extremely high fault-rate for a mission-critical system.
Among the 382 configuration bits, only faults in the PC and the SP registers could be detected by the watchdog timer in a normal system (that is, when no configuration bits are hardened). Therefore only about 8 percent (32 out of 382) of those would be detected and corrected. Our proposal is focused on the protection of the remaining 92 percent.
It must be noted that this paper focuses on the protection of configuration bits, namely those which are written by the program itself. In fact, there are also status bits and, in particular, interrupt flags. These cannot be hardened with the proposed technique as they are volatile, i.e., the hardware peripheral can autonomously modify them.
Yet the total number of such bits is about one order of magnitude less than configuration bits, therefore about ten times less frequent. Furthermore errors in most configuration bits (e.g., baud rate of a UART) normally cause malfunctions for a long period of time until a new configuration is written, while errors in status bits usually generate temporary faults whose effect ends after a limited amount of time (e.g., a SEU in a UART interrupt flag causes one byte to be duplicated inside a message; after the end of the message, all the following messages are again correctly transferred).
SOFT-ERROR MITIGATION IN THE SYSTEM CONFIGURATION DATA
The protection of the configuration data for microcontroller peripherals is a must in mission-critical systems. In this work, we address the hardening of configuration registers (e.g., registers for: clock configuration, peripheral configuration, and interrupt configuration). In particular, hardening the configuration data of interrupts which is a mandatory issue in critical reactive systems. An application whose functionality is directed by interrupt events, and which is mainly managed by means of a set of Interrupt Service Routines is known as an interrupt-driven application. One can identify two different tasks when hardening this kind of applications based on software: the ISR-code hardening itself, and the system configuration hardening.
For the first task, let us suppose the ISR-code to be a typical data driven routine such as a control attitude routine running in a realtime control flight system. Techniques for hardening this kind of routines have already been presented in [10] and, therefore, they are not within the scope of this paper.
The second and most important task is the system configuration hardening. A soft error in the system configuration data is far more disruptive than an error occurring in a non-configuration register (e.g., a bit of a general purpose register used in the ISR-code): the former might prevent a given ISR to be ever called or a full subsystem to be accessed (even after reboot), whereas an error in a general purpose register only affects program functionality occasionally. Hence, this work is aimed to the hardening of the system configuration data.
Regarding the configuration data of a system, as first stated in [1] , two different scenarios can be studied taking into account the lifetime or rating access of the involved storage resources. First, the configuration data remain static during the program execution. Second, the scenario when the configuration data change dynamically throughout the program execution. In both cases, storage resources do have infinite lifetime or a lifetime much higher than most other registers in the system.
Static Configuration Hardening
The term static refers to the contents of configuration registers which are never expected to change. The static configuration hardening addresses the protection of those peripheral configuration registers which remain unchanged during the whole program execution. For instance, this is the case of systems that statically configure their peripherals or I/O subsystems using specific configuration registers, and storing custom configuration words (e.g., baud rate and modulation for UARTs, acquisition modes for ADCs and DACs, counting mode and period for timers/counters, pin direction for I/O ports).
The proposed technique to harden the static configuration data in event-driven applications is summarized in Fig. 1 . Although this approach is mainly based on software, it also needs a hardware timer. Briefly, the approach consists in refreshing the static configuration periodically by means of an additional interrupt service routine that is triggered by a hardware timer.
To maximize the fault coverage, the refreshing rate for the configuration data must be tuned according to two parameters: the expected soft error rate, and the application interrupt rate. A high refreshing rate may improve error mitigation while making the whole system less reactive. An optimal refreshing rate should be determined for each application taking into account these considerations.
Since only a single hardware timer is needed, regardless the number of configuration registers to be protected, the introduced overheads are negligible in terms hardware resources.
Dynamic Configuration Hardening
The second scenario for the hardening of event-driven applications concerns those processors or peripheral configuration registers which are occasionally modified during program execution, i.e., the configuration data is dynamic. For instance, an interrupt occasionally enabled/disabled, a change of ADC configuration, etc.
As in the static case, the hardening interrupt service routine is triggered periodically. However, the main difference with respect to the previous case is that the ISR triggered by the hardware timer does not know beforehand what values to refresh into the configuration registers, as they change throughout the program execution.
Hardening the dynamic configuration data requires the actions illustrated in Fig. 2 . First, during the main processing is necessary to maintain redundant copies (2) of the configuration data (using protected registers/memory). Every time there are configuration changes, the replicas have to be updated. Notice that data should be copied before proceeding to configure the system. Second, the ISR driven by the hardware timer includes majority voters to check the configuration registers correctness (using the original registers and their copies); finally, it refreshes the configuration data accordingly.
Next section presents a case study for both cases: hardening static and dynamic system configuration of an event-driven application.
CASE STUDY

Experimental Setup
The microcontroller used for the experimental setup was built around the PicoBlaze microprocessor [9] . The 8-bit soft-core microprocessor used in this experiment is a technology-independent version, especially developed for this work (RTL PicoBlaze). This version is cycle accurate and RTL equivalent to the original PicoBlaze-3 version. Its main features are: 16 byte-wide general-purpose registers, byte-wide ALU with CARRY and ZERO indicator flags, 64-byte internal scratchpad RAM, 256 input and 256 output ports, 31-location CALL/RETURN stack, 1 interrupt input, INTERRUPT ENABLE (IE) indicator flag.
Besides the 1K instructions (10 bits) of programmable on-chip program store, additional features have been implemented externally to provide PicoBlaze with some of the microcontroller common resources: 1 interrupt controller (int_ctlr), 2 timers (timer0 and timer1), and several I/O ports. In addition, an LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register) module has been included in the circuit. The block diagram of the circuit can be seen in Fig. 3 .
The interrupt controller (int_ctrl) is a peripheral that extends the capability of PicoBlaze to manage up to eight interrupt sources. It should be enabled and configured from the software. The configuration of interrupts has two hierarchical levels: the Interrupt Enable (IE) flag which is a global enable/disable control for the microprocessor interrupts, and the interrupt_mask which is an 8-bit register to enable/disable each interrupt line in the int_ctrl.
Each timer can be configured to generate a system "tick" (interrupt) in the range of 1ms-10 ms, by means of an 8-bit register called timerX_conf (where X is equal to 0 or 1). The interrupt signal of every peripheral is automatically cleared once the interrupt_ack has been received from the PicoBlaze. The LFSR module will be used in the second part of this case study. It generates a bit sequence that will be responsible to emulate dynamic changes to the interrupt controller configuration. This case study comprises two parts. The first one is focused on a scenario for the static configuration case, whereas the second part presents a dynamic configuration scenario.
Static Configuration Scenario
A critical reactive application has been developed, namely a Real Time Clock (RTC), where configuration registers remain unchanged during program execution, so it has a static configuration with infinite lifetime. Fig. 4 presents the flowchart of this application. Hereafter, this version will be called non-hardened static RTC. This is a typical interrupt-driven application, where the main processing is only responsible for the configuration of the microcontroller and its peripherals. The RTC application logic is implemented by the "Interrupt handler RTC" procedure within the ISR. Configuration data for this application is comprised of the following registers: IE flag, interrupt_mask (int_ctrl), and timer0_conf.
According to our proposal, Fig. 5 shows the flowchart of the hardened static RTC application. The hardening strategy is hybrid. On the hardware side, an additional timer (timer1) is used; whereas on the software side, three transformations have been applied to the original code.
Transformation 1 is responsible for the new peripheral configuration. First, the int_ctrl is configured with a new value for the interrupt_mask to enable interrupts coming from timer1 (besides those coming from timer0). Second, the "hard timer" (timer1) is configured according to the required refresh rate.
Transformation 2 does not affect the existing "Interrupt handler RTC"; it only appends a new handler for the "hard timer" interrupt. This handler sends the ACK to the interrupt source and refreshes the static configuration registers (interrupt_mask in the int_ctrl, timer0_conf, and timer1_conf). It is worth noting that interrupt priority is defined by the designer within the code. In this case, since the RTC is a real time application, the "Interrupt handler RTC" has the highest priority.
Finally, Transformation 3 includes an instruction to enable the microcontroller interrupt flag (IE) within the infinite loop in the main process. This will not affect the main process, which instead of doing nothing will be refreshing the interrupt flag. In case a soft error affects the IE flag, it will recover its correct value the next time the "forever" loop is executed. Otherwise, if a fault disables this flag, future interrupts will be ignored.
It must be noted that the additional timer used in our hardening approach (hard timer), can protect the static configuration of several peripherals simultaneously.
Dynamic Configuration Scenario
The experimental setup for this scenario is the same as in the previous case but including the LFSR module, which is responsible to emulate the dynamic nature of the system configuration. It is connected to a PicoBlaze input port, and depending on every value of the generated sequence, it enables/disables the interrupt controller dynamically. Fig. 6 depicts the flowchart of this application (nonhardened dynamic RTC). The differences with respect to the static case can be seen in the main processing, specifically in the three emphasized blocks.
As explained in Section 3.2, in this case, additionally to having a refreshing interrupt service routine which is triggered periodically (as in the static case), the protection for the dynamic configuration consists in maintaining replicated copies of the current configuration. In this way, configuration correctness is checked every time before proceeding to refresh the system configuration by means of a software-based majority voter. Fig. 7 describes the flowchart of the hardened dynamic RTC application.
As in the static case, Transformation 1 is responsible for the new peripheral configuration (timer1-Hard Timer). In addition, notice that the configuration should be replicated as well. In this case study, we replicate the configuration of the interrupt controller (int_ctlr). Copies should be stored in available memory, which can be located externally with its own protection mechanisms. In the experiments, the worst case scenario was implemented since copies are stored within the microprocessor register file.
Transformation 2 inserts replication instructions to create copies every time the configuration changes. Note that replicas should be created before updating the system configuration because it avoids overwriting the correct new configuration value from the periodic refreshing ISR.
Similarly to the static case, Transformation 3 enables the microcontroller interrupt flag (IE) constantly.
Transformation 4 appends a new handler for the "hard timer" interrupt. This handler includes a majority voter procedure to detect and recover any possible data corruption in the configuration. Then, it refreshes the proper configuration registers.
Although the code size overhead caused by this technique is higher than the one produced in the static case, in both cases these overheads are negligible compared to usual softwarebased techniques [6] . The additional code required to implement the proposed approach is in the order of 15 instructions for the static case and 34 instructions for the dynamic case, including the ISR for the hard-timer. Unlike conventional software-based techniques, the proposed transformations are focused only in the mentioned pieces of the source code, and they are not applied to the entire program.
SEU/SET Emulation System (AMUSE)
Fault injection is commonly used in COTS microprocessors to evaluate the error rate. A fault is injected by changing the contents of a register. This action can be triggered by software [12] , interrupts [11] or breakpoints [13] . However, these approaches cannot be used in our case, because they are highly intrusive and can interfere with the generation of true system events. To overcome these limitations, we used the Autonomous MUltilevel emulation System for Soft Error evaluation (AMUSE) emulation system [8] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] .
AMUSE is an emulation-based fault injection system that supports SEU and SET fault injection for any ASIC technology. For SETs, pulses of a selected duration can be injected at any node in the circuit and their propagation analyzed across many clock cycles. Since the propagation of a pulse across combinational logic is delay-dependent, ASIC delays must be properly modeled. To this purpose, AMUSE uses a voltage-time quantization approach that accurately models dynamic delay effects, including electrical masking effects [19] . Quantized rising/falling transition curves are implemented by a non-linear counter driven by a time quantization clock. This approach enables embedding ASIC delays into a model that can be synthesized and mapped into a FPGA to speed up the fault injection process. AMUSE combines a delay-accurate gate-level model with a fast Fig. 6 . Flowchart of the non-hardened dynamic RTC application. Fig. 7 . Flowchart of the hardened dynamic RTC application. cycle-accurate register transfer level model to improve performance without loss of accuracy [8] . Thanks to this multilevel scheme, very high fault injection rates are obtained and very large fault injection campaigns can be executed in a short time.
Since our experimental setup is based on a soft-core microcontroller, it can be used within the FPGA-based fault emulation system AMUSE in order to exhaustively evaluate the fault coverage in real conditions. Hence, fault injection tests with a large number of faults can be carried out to obtain statistically representative reliability results.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The proposed approach has been validated by fault injection using the AMUSE emulation system. The extended Picoblaze microcontroller was synthesized for the 90 nm ASIC library technology provided by Synopsys (SAED90nm) [25] . Fault injection campaigns were performed for several software versions with different interrupt and refresh rates, also including the original, unprotected software version. The results presented in this paper focus only on the evaluation of the proposed approach to harden the configuration data of microcontroller peripherals and interrupts. The SEU and SET sensitivities of the microprocessor core using partial hardware and software hardening have been analyzed previously in [16] and [17] , respectively.
For the sake of comparison, each hardened software version is characterized by the ratio of the refresh rate to the interrupt rate. We refer to this ratio as the Relative Refresh Rate (RRR). For instance, RRR ¼ 1 means the configuration registers are refreshed on average as often as interrupts occur. If the configuration registers are refreshed several times between two interrupts, then RRR is greater than 1. Conversely, a RRR value smaller than 1 means the refresh rate is smaller than the interrupt rate and that several interrupts may occur without refreshing the configuration registers. The non-hardened version is characterized by RRR ¼ 0, i.e., no refresh at all.
The refresh rate is determined by the "hard timer" configuration. The ISR of the "hard timer" requires 64 clock cycles to execute and refresh the peripheral registers. A critical situation may happen when there is a collision between the "RTC timer" and the "hard timer" interrupts. For simplicity, we considered that a delay of 100 clock cycles in servicing the "RTC timer" interrupt is acceptable for the application. Thus, in case the "RTC timer" interrupt signal arrives while the "hard timer" interrupt is being serviced, the "RTC timer" interrupt service will be slightly delayed. Interrupt priorities can be used if the "RTC timer" interrupt cannot be delayed.
Static Configuration Results
For the first experiments, we set the RTC interrupt rate to 500 clock cycles and the refresh rate to several values between 5,000 clock cycles (RRR ¼ 0:1) and 50 clock cycles (RRR ¼ 10). The original version with no refresh (RRR ¼ 0, hard timer disabled) was also included in the experiments. The results for SEU and SET fault injection are summarized in Figs. 8 and 9 , respectively.
For each refresh rate, we run the application for 65,000 clock cycles, servicing 130 RTC interrupt events. Along this time, we injected 12,534 random SETs and SEUs into every gate and flipflop, respectively, of the peripheral circuit, which includes the timers and the interrupt controller. SEUs were also injected into the interrupt enable flag register, since this register is critical for the peripheral operation. For gates, SET pulses of 500 ps were injected at random instants. For flip-flops, SEUs were injected at random clock cycles. The total number of faults injected in each version was 5,414,688 faults.
The results in Fig. 8 show that the SEU sensitivity can be reduced from 13.4 percent in the original circuit to 1.3 percent in the case of RRR ¼ 10. As expected, the error rate reduces when the refresh rate increases, and the reduction is significantly higher for RRR greater than 1. Remarkably, the interrupt enable flag produced no error in all hardened versions while it has a sensitivity of 85 percent in the original non-hardened version. The results for SETs in Fig. 9 are very similar, but with smaller error rates.
In practical cases, very high error mitigation can be obtained since the time between interrupts is typically much larger than the one we used in the experiments (500 clock cycles). The opportunity window for an error to appear is then reduced to the time between the last refresh and the next application interrupt, which can be made very small by increasing the refresh rate.
We have also checked that errors in the hard-timer and errors due the execution of the hardening ISR are mostly benign, because the effect in most cases is just a temporary change in the refresh rate, which is eventually corrected when the ISR is executed again. For instance, the hardening ISR uses a single register (s0) to configure the refresh rate, and the SEU error sensitivity of this register varies from 0.37 to 0.69 percent when the RRR varies between 0 and 10 respectively. This result has been obtained when this register is not hardened at all. These errors can be easily removed by software hardening of the ISR.
In a second set of experiments, the refresh rate was set to the minimum feasible value of 100 clock cycles, while the RTC interrupt rate was varied to evaluate how the error rate decreases as interrupts occur less frequently. Fig. 10 shows the SEU error rate in this case. For RRR ¼ 1, the error rate is smaller than in Fig. 8 because the refresh rate is higher now. For RRR higher than 25 (2,500 clock cycles between interrupts), the error coverage is higher than 99 percent. Fig. 11 shows the results for the dynamic configuration case. As in the first experiment, the RTC interrupt rate was set to 500 clock cycles, but interrupts were randomly enabled/disabled, depending on the bit sequence generated by the peripheral LFSR. The RRR is referred to the average interrupt rate. Although there is no fixed interrupt rate, the proposed approach is similarly effective: the higher the refresh rate, the higher the mitigation.
Dynamic Configuration Results
As it can be seen, the error rate is higher than in the static case, but presents a similar trend reaching to an important decrease of errors for moderate refresh rates.
An additional experiment was carried out injecting faults into the configuration register replicas (located in the microprocessor register file). Error rate did not vary significantly due to the software redundancy.
A more detailed analysis of the results in both cases, static and dynamic, points out that only one single internal register of the interrupt controller is the source of more than 80 percent of the residual errors (those ones that are not mitigated using high RRR). This specific register is not accessible from the software and, therefore, determines the maximum fault coverage that can be achieved with this technique, above 99 percent. If this register is hardened by hardware, the error rate reduces by more than one additional order of magnitude.
Regarding the software overheads introduced by the technique, the increase in the code size comprises the insertion of a few lines of code responsible to: rewrite the configuration data and its replicas, implement the voter procedure, and handle the hardening interrupt event. On the hardware side, the overhead only supposes one additional timer, regardless the number of configuration data to protect. In addition, there is no performance overhead because the execution of the refreshing procedure takes place when the main processing is not being executed. However, there is a possible low impact in the system responsiveness. This occurs only in case the hardening interrupt routine is being executed when the application interrupt arrives. This supposes to delay the system response for the number of clock cycles until the hardening ISR finishes its work (in the worst case in terms of latency, 64 and 94 clock cycles respectively for the static and dynamic scenarios). Moreover, power consumption overhead is a must issue to be addressed in the design of embedded systems with tight power budget. Although the repetitive execution of the refreshing routine increases the power consumption, this overhead is negligible for low RRR because it comprises only a few instructions. In case of high RRR causing excessive power demand, designers should always find the best trade-offs among RRR, reliability, and power to cope with the system requirements.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf components in low-cost safety-critical systems offers important benefits. However, it is necessary to reduce their vulnerability to radiation-induced effects, such as soft-errors. This work proposes a systematic approach for soft-error mitigation that attempts to overcome the limitations of common ad-hoc solutions.
The technique was assessed by extensive fault injection campaigns for SEUs and SETs. The impact in code size and cost was negligible independently of the number of configuration registers to be protected. It is worth noting that a single timer can be used to protect several configuration registers. The results show an important increase in fault coverage for SEUs and SETs, about one order of magnitude. From the experiments, it is deduced that the refresh rate and the interrupt rate are directly related in static and dynamic cases. Regarding the final application, the RRR can be used to find the best trade-off between reliability and system responsiveness. The proposed approach can be combined with other hardening approaches [10] to protect the complete processor-based system.
